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Draft – please do not distribute or cite without permission 
China and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Towards a More Active Norm-Shaping Role? 
Andrew Garwood-Gowers 
Introduction 
It is now more than a decade since the responsibility to protect (R2P) was unanimously endorsed by 
states at the 2005 World Summit. Yet there remains significant contestation over both the content 
and implementation of the norm. States continue to hold diverging interpretations of the meaning 
and scope of the concept, while attempts to operationalise R2P’s more coercive elements have 
often been resisted. 
As a rising power and a veto-holding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), China’s perspective on R2P is critical to the norm’s future development and implementation. 
Although Beijing has consistently maintained its overall support for R2P at a rhetorical level, its 
ongoing attachment to a strict interpretation of state sovereignty and non-intervention means that 
China has been uncomfortable with the coercive, non-consensual elements of the international 
responsibility to protect. This has led China to block UNSC proposals for sanctions against Myanmar 
(2007), Zimbabwe (2008), and most recently, Syria on four occasions. However, China did support 
the imposition of sanctions against Libya and abstain on resolution 1973 authorising the use of force 
against the Gaddafi regime, suggesting there is some flexibility in its position towards coercive pillar 
III measures. Since Libya, China has also supported a range of consensual pillar II actions and sought 
to contribute more significantly to peace operations in Africa.    
This paper considers two main questions. First, how has China engaged with R2P and influenced the 
concept’s normative trajectory? Second, is a distinct Chinese perspective and practice of R2P 
emerging? The paper draws primarily on official Chinese discourse and practice at the UN level since 
2005, both in thematic discussions of R2P (and the related norm of Protection of Civilians (POC)) and 
responses to country-specific crises. It also examines the semi-official Chinese concept of 
“Responsible Protection” (RP), as a possible experiment in norm entrepreneurship.1 While the 
primary focus is on empirical evidence obtained from discourse and practice, the paper seeks to 
contextualise China’s behaviour within a critical constructivist framework which recognises that 
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norms often remain contested even after institutionalisation and that implementation experiences 
can shape the content and strength of such norms.  
The paper advances two main arguments. First, a decade of official Chinese discourse reveals a large 
degree of continuity in terms of the perspectives expressed towards R2P. Most significantly, this 
indicates consistent support for R2P but clear efforts to frame the concept in a manner that aligns 
with China’s own normative preferences and interests. This has meant a strong emphasis on pillars I 
and II, while downplaying the potential for coercive, non-consensual action which could undermine 
the centrality of the state. The second main argument is that recent Chinese practice suggests a 
possible shift in strategy from norm resistance to a more proactive norm-shaping role in relation to 
R2P. Resistance – by blocking the implementation of coercive pillar III measures - remains an 
essential element of Beijing’s approach but there are signs that this is now being supplemented by 
more concerted Chinese efforts to entrench the consensual state-assistance components of R2P 
which Beijing supports. This is reflected in more visible engagement in normative discourse – via the 
RP concept’s conservative interpretation of the international community’s protection role - and 
more practically, in enhanced Chinese contributions to peace operations in Africa and diplomatic 
efforts to resolve protection crises. Whether or not these practical initiatives are motivated by, or 
intended to directly influence, R2P, one of their effects is to embed consensual state assistance and 
peaceful measures as the dominant means through which the international community exercises its 
responsibility to protect. Post-Libya UNSC practice involving pillars I and II illustrates this 
development, suggesting that these aspects of R2P are being strengthened at the expense of the 
coercive pillar III dimension.  
The paper proceeds in three parts. The first briefly outlines the concept of R2P and highlights how its 
complex, indeterminate nature creates significant scope for ongoing contestation and resistance 
after institutionalisation. The second part examines the main phases in China’s engagement with 
R2P and highlights the key themes that are found in Beijing’s official discourse. The third part 
focuses on recent indications of a possible shift towards China adopting a more proactive norm-
shaping role.  
 
R2P as a complex and contested norm 
While R2P is most often treated as a single norm, it is in fact more accurate to describe it as a bundle 
of norms. Drawn from paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, R2P 
contains three separate normative prescriptions, conceptualised as “pillars” in the UN Secretary 
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General’s 2009 Report.2 The first pillar refers to the responsibility of states to protect their 
populations from the four mass atrocity crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
ethnic cleansing). Pillar two stipulates that the international community should assist states in 
fulfilling their responsibility to protect. This can involve helping to build state capacity to protect but 
also assisting states that are “under stress before conflicts and crises break out”.3 The critical 
characteristic of pillar II is that international action is based upon host state consent. The third and 
final pillar encompasses the international community’s general responsibility to employ peaceful 
protection measures plus a commitment to consider taking “collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, 
on a case-by-case basis” where a state is “manifestly failing” to protect its populations.4 The latter 
dimension covers the possibility of coercive, non-consensual action, including the use of military 
force. There is no automatic duty to employ a prescribed set of measures, but rather a commitment 
to consider possible responses that are available through existing institutional mechanisms. 
Recent critical constructivist accounts of norm development and diffusion increasingly recognise 
that norms may remain contested and dynamic even after being formally endorsed or 
institutionalised by states.5 For instance, conceptual ambiguity or complexity may continue to 
provide opportunities for different actors to advance different interpretations of a norm.6 In R2P’s 
case, its complex and indeterminate structure creates opportunities for states to adopt and promote 
diverging interpretations of the concept. Despite R2P’s unanimous endorsement at the 2005 World 
Summit, states continue to interpret its scope and content in different ways.7 In particular, emphasis 
can be placed on one or more of its normative prescriptions at the expense of others. As will be 
illustrated in part two, states such as China have typically framed R2P in a manner that stresses the 
pillar I and pillar II dimensions, while downplaying the scope for coercive pillar III measures. On the 
other hand, the UK and France continue to view R2P in more robust terms that reflect its origins as 
an offshoot of humanitarian intervention. 
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Contestation also arises in attempts to implement R2P. This can include preliminary disagreement 
over whether a situation should be viewed through an R2P lens or not, as illustrated by different 
characterisations of the final stages of the conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009. Some states saw R2P as 
relevant to the situation while others framed the violence as a legitimate government response to 
longstanding security threats from the Tamil Tigers.8 Where R2P is accepted as an appropriate 
framework for considering international action, contestation may centre on whether the 
international community’s responsibility has been triggered or whether a state should be granted 
more time to address its own responsibility to protect. Finally, states may disagree over appropriate 
protection responses that the Security Council is seeking to enforce. Syria provides the most 
dramatic example of this latter type of contestation over R2P’s implementation. 
Actual and attempted implementation of a new norm can shape the content and strength of a norm 
in a number of ways. First, implementation experiences that are viewed as legitimate and produce 
desirable outcomes for relevant actors can strengthen the standing of a new norm by creating 
“precedents” that entrench or embed a new norm within international practice.9 Building up a 
number of relevant precedents through repeated implementation can lead to rapid consolidation of 
a norm. On the other hand, multiple failures to implement a norm can undermine its strength and 
legitimacy and prevent it from maturing. This produces what Bloomfield calls “stalled” progress or 
“arrested development”.10 For this reason, blocking the implementation of a norm in particular 
situations can be a tactic that “norm antipreneurs” adopt to prevent the consolidation of a new 
norm.11 A third possible effect is that a norm is implemented but produces an undesirable result 
which leads to a reassessment of the validity of that norm. In such circumstances, relevant actors 
may re-evaluate their support for the norm or re-frame its content or scope in a manner that aligns 
with their own interests and normative preferences.  
The key point arising from these three scenarios is that while norms are typically conceived as 
shaping practice, it is important to recognise that the opposite process may also occur: that is, 
practice can also shape norms. This consideration is relevant in part three, when we examine how 
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recent Chinese practice of R2P may be affecting the strength of R2P’s various normative 
prescriptions.  
 
China’s engagement with R2P 
China’s engagement with R2P can be divided into three main phases.12 The first covers the period 
from the original 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
report on R2P until the 2005 World Summit. The second phase spans the 2005 World Summit 
through to the outbreak of the Libyan crisis in early 2011. The third covers the period from the 
Libyan intervention to the present time. 
China’s initial reaction to the original ICISS notion of R2P was largely negative. Beijing was strongly 
opposed to the suggestion that non-consensual military action might be taken without UN Security 
Council authorisation. Fearing that such a concept was open to abuse, China insisted that responses 
to humanitarian crises must “strictly conform to the UN Charter” and that “it falls on the Security 
Council to make the decision”.13 China was not alone in resisting these elements of the original R2P 
concept; other Security Council members also opposed aspects of the ICISS proposal. Ultimately, this 
resistance led to significant modifications to R2P, enabling China and other states to endorse the 
more modest concept that was presented in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.  
Having accepted R2P in 2005, the next phase of China’s engagement with the concept was 
characterised by cautious support for a conservative interpretation of R2P. This meant Beijing 
framed R2P primarily in terms of its preventive and state assistance elements – those aspects of the 
concept that could be reconciled with China’s traditional emphasis on state sovereignty and non-
intervention. While China expressed rhetorical support for R2P, this was coupled with a strategy of 
“norm containment” which involved resistance to attempts to implement R2P’s coercive, non-
consensual elements in the UN Security Council. China abstained on resolution 1706 on Darfur (the 
first country-specific UNSC resolution to mention R2P) and vetoed proposals to apply sanctions 
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against Myanmar (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008).14 This strategy continued until 2011 when the Libyan 
crisis broke out. 
At first glance, the rapid, decisive international response to the Libyan crisis seemed to signal the 
beginning of a new era of international cooperation on civilian protection. China’s support for 
resolution 1970 and abstention on resolution 1973 authorising the use of force against the Gaddafi 
regime came as a surprise to many observers, as it appeared to represent a sharp break from 
Beijing’s traditional practice of resisting the operationalisation of coercive pillar III measures. 
However, closer examination of Chinese discourse indicated that Beijing’s decision not to veto 
resolution 1973 was the product of an unusual convergence of circumstances – including the 
presence of relevant regional organisations supporting international intervention, the clarity of the 
threat to civilians, and the rapid fragmentation of the Gaddafi regime.15 These factors, rather than a 
sudden normative embrace of pillar III, were the main drivers of China’s position on Libya.  
Since the Libyan intervention Beijing has expressed renewed concerns about the possibility of R2P 
being used as a pretext for regime change. Although it is difficult to determine precisely how much 
direct influence the Libyan experience has had on China’s position towards the Syrian crisis, it is clear 
from the four double vetoes cast by Russia and China that both states are determined not to allow 
coercive measures to be imposed on the Assad regime. At the same time is important to note that 
Beijing has been prepared to support a number of UNSC resolutions on Syria, including those 
relating to the UN Observer Mission, the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons supplies, 
humanitarian aid access plans and a roadmap for peace talks.16 However, with the exception of the 
relatively weak humanitarian aid access resolutions – which were not agreed to by the Syrian 
government – the other resolutions that China supported were all based on host state consent and 
are, therefore, consistent with Beijing’s longstanding acceptance of pillar II assistance measures.  
Interestingly, in the post-Libya period there is strong evidence of increasing Chinese support for 
consensual pillar II measures with respect to other protection crises. Beijing has supported UNSC 
resolutions that have referenced R2P in relation to situations in Yemen, Mali, South Sudan, 
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Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Liberia.17 This indicates that the 
controversy surrounding coercive pillar III measures has not undermined support for R2P’s other 
dimensions. Fears that the Libyan experience might lead to “broader normative contamination” 
have not been realised.18 In fact, as part three illustrates, R2P’s pillar I and II elements are becoming 
more firmly entrenched in international practice. 
Having outlined the three main phases in China’s engagement with R2P it is useful to briefly highlight 
the key themes that feature in China’s official discourse on R2P.19 Examining statements made in 
both thematic discussion of R2P (and POC) and country-specific debates on civilian protection 
reveals a significant degree of continuity and consistency in terms of the perspectives expressed by 
Beijing since the World Summit Outcome version of R2P was endorsed in 2005. There are five 
principal themes. The first is Beijing’s insistence that R2P applies only to the four specified mass 
atrocity crimes and must not be expanded or interpreted more broadly to include other situations. 
This reflects China’s concern that some states may seek to widen the scope of R2P’s application and 
implement it in a broader range of circumstances. The second key point that appears in Chinese 
statements is a clear emphasis on the primary responsibility of the state. In stressing the primacy of 
pillar I, Beijing is seeking to reinforce the centrality of the state and downplay the international 
community’s residual responsibility to protect.  
As far as the international responsibility is concerned, the third key feature of Beijing’s official 
discourse is an emphasis on framing the international protection role as one of “assistance” and 
“support” to build state capacity. This reflects China’s longstanding efforts to conceptualise the 
international responsibility to protect in terms of pillar II notions of consent and cooperation, rather 
than as coercive, non-consensual pillar III measures. Closely related to this is the fourth principal 
theme – namely, that peaceful means of protection should be prioritised over the coercive elements 
of the R2P tool kit. This reflects a desire to frame international protection responses in a manner 
that aligns with Beijing’s continuing emphasis on non-intervention, and also conveys China’s 
scepticism over the efficacy of coercive measures.  The fifth and final theme that often appears in 
official Chinese discourse is a reminder that states continue to hold diverging perspectives on R2P 
and that consequently, further discussion should be held at the UN level (i.e. within the General 
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Assembly, as provided for in the World Summit declaration). This is often connected to an attempt 
to downplay the normative status of R2P by characterising it as a mere “concept”, rather than a 
fully- fledged “norm” or “principle” of international law. Overall, Beijing has consistently highlighted 
these five themes in an attempt to present an interpretation of R2P that aligns with China’s broader 
normative preferences and strategic culture.  
Towards a more active norm-shaping role? 
While the previous section illustrated that China’s discourse on R2P has been largely consistent over 
a number of years, there are some indications that Beijing is seeking to exert greater influence over 
the development of international norms across a range of areas.20 Recent official policy documents 
contain explicit expressions of an intention to play a more active role in shaping global norms. For 
example, in the October 2014 plenum on the Rule of Law, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party issued a directive that China should: 
Vigorously participate in the formulation of international norms … strengthen our country’s discourse power 
and influence in international legal affairs, use legal methods to safeguard our country’s sovereignty, security 
and development interests.
21
 
This was followed up by an opinion piece by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi which outlined similar 
themes, including reference to China’s role as an “active builder” of international rules and a 
commitment that “[a]s China grows stronger, it will make [a] greater contribution to the 
maintenance and promotion of [the] international rule of law”.22 These statements suggest a clear 
intention to shape global norms and rules in a manner that aligns with China’s own normative 
preferences and interests.  
There is also some evidence that this intention to assume more prominent leadership roles is being 
translated into practice. Cybersecurity in particular is an area where China has recently sought to 
promote its own normative framework as a foundation for the development of new global rules.23 It 
floated a state-centric model of internet sovereignty to govern cyber space, as an alternative to the 
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broader, multi-stakeholder regime supported by other states.24 Although the Chinese initiative has 
not attracted widespread support yet, it is a significant illustration of Beijing’s increased activism and 
willingness to offer normative alternatives in specific policy areas.  
In the R2P context, there are also signs of a possible shift in China’s engagement with the concept. 
Whereas the dominant feature of Beijing’s approach since 2005 has been an effort to constrain the 
implementation of coercive pillar III measures, recent behaviour suggests that this is now being 
supplemented by more proactive steps to promote and entrench the consensual, state-assistance 
aspects of R2P. This can be detected in two main developments: first, enhanced Chinese 
engagement in normative discourse and second, more pronounced support for, and participation in, 
pillar II peace operations and diplomatic efforts to resolve protection crises.  
 
R2P discourse: China’s “Responsible Protection” concept 
The first of these developments is illustrated by the creation of a semi-official Chinese interpretation 
of R2P known as “Responsible Protection” (RP).25 This concept was proposed in mid-2012 by Ruan 
Zongze from the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which is a think tank linked to the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Like Brazil’s Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) initiative, RP 
was clearly motivated by concern that NATO exceeded its mandate for the use of force in Libya.26 
The RP concept draws heavily on the Brazilian proposal and on aspects of just war theory included in 
the original ICISS R2P report. Its six elements outline decision-making criteria or guidelines for 
considering military action for humanitarian purposes, a monitoring mechanism to oversee any such 
action, and a commitment to post-intervention rebuilding. In this respect, the proposals in the 
Chinese initiative are not entirely original. However, the way in which the elements are framed is 
stricter than RwP and the ICISS report, creating very limited scope for the implementation of 
coercive pillar III measures. Overall, RP emphasises many of the same themes that feature in China’s 
official discourse, including Beijing’s clear preference for preventive, consensual means of civilian 
protection. In this way, it is intended to promote a more conservative interpretation of the 
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international community’s protection role that aligns with China’s view of how humanitarian crises 
should be addressed. 
The RP proposal is explicitly framed by Ruan as an example of China “contributing its public goods to 
the international community”.27 He argues that “China must have the courage to speak out and 
contribute its ideas to the world even though it means China will face more difficult and complicated 
options”.28 Despite these exhortations, Beijing has not formally endorsed the RP concept. There are, 
however, indications that the proposal has received some official support. RP was the subject of a 
CIIS-hosted international conference in October 2013, which involved a number of representatives 
from other BRICS states and prominent R2P figures such as Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur. The 
“responsible protection” label has also been mentioned briefly in speeches by Chinese officials.29 For 
these reasons, RP is probably best classified as a semi-official concept. Although adopting and 
promoting RP does not appear to be an ongoing priority for China, the concept may come to be 
viewed as an early experiment in R2P norm entrepreneurship in which the leadership floats and 
tests ideas via think-tanks which are engaged to conduct “public diplomacy” on Beijing’s behalf.30  
 
R2P practice: increased participation in consent-based pillar II measures and diplomatic initiatives 
As well as seeking to influence R2P’s development through its contribution to discourse, China’s 
practical engagement with the concept can be interpreted as an attempt to actively shape the norm 
through practice. Since 2005, resisting attempts to implement coercive pillar III measures has been 
the primary tactic for slowing the normative entrenchment of that aspect of the concept. However, 
recently there have been signs of more active Chinese involvement in operationalising the 
consensual, state assistance aspects of pillar II and the diplomatic and peaceful means available 
under pillar III. These developments may indicate that Beijing believes it can no longer maintain an 
exclusive role as a spoiler or blocker of international protection action but must also work to 
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strengthen the practical application of those aspects of R2P that align with its own normative 
preferences. In other words, having consistently framed its R2P discourse around pillars I and II 
China is now seeking to consolidate its rhetoric through practical action.  
The first area which points to a possible shift in strategy is in Beijing’s support for consensual pillar II 
protection measures. As noted in part two, since the Libyan intervention there has been a 
proliferation of UNSC resolutions which expressly mention R2P.31 Although these references are 
primarily to the pillar I responsibility of states as opposed to the broader international responsibility 
to protect, it is significant that R2P language is now included in the texts of such resolutions almost 
as a matter of course.32 Previously, attempts to refer to R2P were often met with sustained 
resistance from China, Russia and other sceptic states. However, such resistance has now largely 
disappeared, at least in the context of international efforts to reference R2P when mandating 
consensual pillar II measures.33  
China is not only becoming far more comfortable with the inclusion of R2P language in UNSC 
resolutions dealing with pillar II situations; it is also increasingly prepared to participate in the peace 
operations that such resolutions mandate. Chinese involvement in peace operations is, of course, 
not a new development. Beijing has long recognised that consent-based peace operations are an 
aspect of international civilian protection action that aligns with its own normative preferences, and 
that active participation potentially offers China practical, operational and reputational benefits.34 
However, recently there have been several high profile commitments that signal a deeper 
involvement in peace operations. These include the September 2015 announcement that China 
would establish a permanent peacekeeping force of 8,000 police personnel and increase its funding 
contributions.35 At an operational level, Beijing has also demonstrated its willingness to contribute to 
the more robust aspects of peace operations by deploying its first battalion of combat troops to the 
UN mission in South Sudan in April 2015.36 While enhanced Chinese involvement in this area is likely 
to be motivated by a range of factors, contributing to this aspect of the R2P tool kit serves China’s 
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interests by entrenching the international community’s protection role as one of consensual, state 
assistance. Chinese contributions therefore help to strengthen and embed the pillar II aspect of the 
norm in international practice. 
There are also signs of enhanced Chinese participation in a second area of R2P implementation – the 
use of diplomatic and other peaceful measures aimed at addressing protection crises. These types of 
measures are a frequently overlooked dimension of pillar III – which is often characterised as being 
exclusively coercive in nature – and can also be utilised in a pillar II context.37  Regardless of which 
pillar they are classified as falling under, peaceful measures are a form of protection action that 
China has consistently emphasised in its R2P discourse. Yet, Beijing’s stated preference for the use of 
diplomacy and political dialogue has not always been accompanied by a willingness to apply such 
means in practice. However, as Teitt argues, Beijing now “appears increasingly intent on playing a 
more active role in facilitating peace processes as evidence that China is not merely blocking 
measures, but offering alternative strategies for achieving civilian protection”.38  
This shift towards more concerted Chinese diplomatic efforts can be seen in recent peace initiatives 
aimed at resolving the Syrian crisis.39 These have included Beijing hosting visiting high level 
delegations from the Syrian government and opposition in December 2015 and January 2016 
respectively. After these meetings, in late March 2016 China announced the appointment of its first 
special envoy to Syria.40 While Beijing has undertaken similar diplomatic initiatives in parts of Africa 
(Sudan and South Sudan) in the past, its recent involvement in Syria plus attempts to mediate in 
Afghanistan and between Iran and Saudi Arabia, point to a more active Chinese role in facilitating 
peace processes.  
Although some caution is needed when interpreting these recent developments, it is possible to 
view deeper Chinese engagement with these forms of R2P implementation as signs of a subtle shift 
away from a strategy that primarily sought to prevent the application of coercive pillar III measures, 
towards one that aims to entrench consensual, cooperative and peaceful measures as the dominant 
features of international civilian protection. As I have argued elsewhere, the combined effect of 
accumulating further precedents involving pillar II action and resisting the application of pillar III 
                                                          
37
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coercion could be a re-balancing of R2P’s three pillar structure.41 Pillar II may be strengthened by a 
growing commitment to operationalising that dimension of the concept, while the coercive 
elements of pillar III could lose momentum as a result of ongoing resistance to their implementation. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has illustrated that China has consistently sought to frame R2P in a manner that aligns 
with its own normative preferences and values. Beijing has been able to do so partly because R2P’s 
complex and indeterminate three pillar structure enables states to adopt varying interpretations of 
the strength and scope of its respective components. In China’s case, its official R2P discourse has 
highlighted the pillar I and II aspects of the norm, while downplaying the potential for coercive pillar 
III measures.  
As well as maintaining a distinct interpretation of R2P’s content and meaning, Beijing has adopted a 
strategy of resisting attempts to implement the coercive, non-consensual elements of pillar III. It has 
been prepared to exercise its veto to block UN Security Council resolutions on a number of 
occasions, thereby slowing the entrenchment of the more interventionist aspects of R2P that 
threaten to undermine the centrality of the state. Yet, as China signals its intent to contribute more 
actively to global norm building across a number of issue areas, there are recent signs that Beijing’s 
strategy towards R2P may be shifting. While Chinese resistance to coercive pillar III implementation 
is likely to continue, it appears that there is now a greater willingness to support and participate in 
consensual pillar II action via peace operations, and also to explore diplomatic and other peaceful 
means of protection. These developments have the potential to strengthen the cooperative  and 
consensual aspects of the international responsibility to protect at the expense of the more coercive, 
interventionist elements, illustrating not only that norms shape practice but also that practice can 
shape norms. 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                          
41
 Garwood-Gowers, ‘R2P Ten Years After the World Summit’, 325-6. 
